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Constitution-making, constitutional conventions and
conflict resolution: lesson drawing for Cyprus
FERNANDO MENDEZ and VASILIKI TRIGA
Introduction
This paper is concerned with the analysis of the proposal for a constitutional
convention for Cyprus1 as a potential conflict resolution mechanism. Like
many concepts in the social sciences, the concept of a constitutional convention
is a fuzzy construct. Despite this, we argue that the concept can still serve as
useful analytical heuristic for examining a variety of constitution-making
options that are pertinent to the conflict. In putting forward our argument we
shall devote most of our attention to what we call the operational procedures
of constitution-making—one of which is a constitutional convention.
In addition, we shall take an expansive view of a constitutional convention
that is concerned with inter alia implementing a new or modified constitutional
regime. However, we shall also mention cases of constitutional transformation
where the convention process has been specifically avoided. This will help us
to establish analytical boundaries to the convention method. To aid us in our
analytical efforts we will draw on the discipline of comparative politics to
examine varying procedural mechanisms that have been used at foundational
or transformational constitutional moments, many of which have resulted
in power-sharing arrangements as mechanisms of conflict resolution in
divided societies.
We begin in the next section by putting forward a conceptual framework for
analysing the constitution-making process according to a number of dimensions.
In the third section we undertake a closer examination of the constitutional
convention method and its operational procedures with the aid of some
celebrated historical cases. In the fourth section we present the results of a
comparative analysis of over 100 cases according to a two-dimensional model.
This then sets the scene for a closer look at the case of Cyprus in fifth section.
By way of conclusion we offer some speculations on the feasibility of a
constitutional convention for Cyprus.
Constitution-making: a framework of analysis
Constitutions are a complex piece ofmachinery that prescribe a political order and
establish the basic rules of institutional engagement. The constitution-making
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1The proposal for a constitutional convention for Cyprus is put forward in Andreas Auer, ‘On the
way to a constitutional convention for Cyprus’, in Andreas Auer and Vasiliki Triga (eds),
A Constitutional Convention for Cyprus, Wissenschaftlicher Verlag, Berlin, 2008, pp. 13–26.
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process is therefore a highly salient political event. Although the constitution-
making process is sometimes dominated by a single individual (e.g. Solon and the
Athenian polis or De Gaulle and the French Fifth Republic), it is frequently the
result of a specific political bargain between disparate and competing elites.2 Such
political bargains are especially prevalent in the case of federal constitutions. In his
seminal contribution to the analysis of federalism, William Riker identified three
theoretically salient features of federal arrangements: their origins, operation and
significance.3 Although his approach was specifically concerned with federal
arrangements, it still offers a useful template for understanding the constitution-
making process. Applied to our specific analytical interest in the constitution-
making process we can distinguish between: (1) origins, meaning the specific
contextual and background factors that gave birth to a given constitution-making
exercise; (2) operation, which relates to the specific method and procedures
adopted for elaborating a constitutional package; and (3) the significance of the
adoption (or non-adoption) of a particular constitutional package.4
Riker had much to say about these three dimensions and is particularly
famous for postulating a generalization for the first dimension. What was it that
propelled rational political elites to come together and seek federation in the first
place? Riker’s answer to this conundrum was devastatingly simple. A military
threat. Only such a threat or crisis could compel ordinarily self-interested
political elites representing diverse territorial units and/or ethnic and religious
constituencies to give up power and form a federation. Recent scholarship has
relaxed the military threat assumption to argue that an economic crisis or cultural
threat may be functionally equivalent to the military threat.5 In terms of the
origins of a constitutional bargain, a crisis, whether real or perceived, has
historically provided a powerful stimulus for antagonistic and competing
political elites to seek accommodation in a variety of power-sharing
arrangements that appear relevant to the case of Cyprus.6 The same is true for
many of the constitutional moments that are the subject of this paper. In short, the
link between crisis and constitution-making is rather robust.7 Many of the
constitution-making processes we survey occurred in the context of revolu-
tionary or traumatic events such as civil war, the creation of a new federation
2Jon Elster, ‘The optimal design of a constituent assembly’, conference paper presented at
Colloquium on Collective Wisdom, Colle`ge de France, 22–23 May 2008, available at ,http://
telechargeu.cines.fr/3517/load/documents//cerimes/UPL55488_Elster.pdf..
3William H. Riker, Federalism: Origin, Operation, Significance, Little Brown, Boston, 1964.
4It should be noted that for Riker dimensions 2 and 3 had a different meaning to that which is
used in our understanding.
5David McKay, ‘William Riker on federalism: sometimes wrong but more right than anyone
else?’, Regional & Federal Studies, 14, 2004, pp. 167–186; Mikhail Filippov, ‘Riker and federalism’,
Constitutional Political Economy, 16, 2005, pp. 93–111.
6Riker’s insight, accordingly modified, is certainly pertinent to the case of Cyprus. At the
perceptual level the security threat, both military (for the Greek Cypriot community) and economic
(for the Turkish Cypriot community), is certainly present although it affects each community
inversely. If true, then one could speculate that the economic turbulence that has followed the
financial crisis sparked in 2008 may put further pressure on the Turkish Cypriot community to seek a
negotiated solution. On the other hand, the integration of the Republic of Cyprus (ROC) into the
European Union, and the fact that it is a full member state of the latter, may have diminished the
salience of the security threat.
7Jon Elster, ‘Forces and mechanisms in the constitution-making process’, Duke Law Journal, 45,
1995, pp. 364–396.
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as a result of independence from a colonial government, or as a result of a severe
constitutional impasse. Our primary focus, however, is not to explain the origins
of such foundational constitutional transformations. Neither will we explicitly
focus on the significance of the constitution-making process by looking at success
and failures, though we acknowledge the importance of this dimension.8 Instead,
in our analysis we shall focus on certain procedural aspects of the constitution-
making process while remaining agnostic as to the form or substance of a given
constitutional package. Thus, our focus is on the second dimension, namely, the
operation dimension, which is understood as the specific mechanisms used
during the constitution-making process. Are there any common operational
procedures underlying the constitution-making process? And if so, can these
shed further analytical light on the operation of constitutional conventions?
Furthermore, can any of these findings be used to elucidate the dynamics
involved in the case of Cyprus?
Before addressing some of the above questions it will be necessary to further
specify the type of constitutional events we are analysing. The constitution-
making process can usually be considered as a political event of the first order—
though not all constitutional moments are necessarily first-order political events.
In fact, the notion of a ‘first-order’ constitutional event can be usefully contrasted
with what we shall refer to as a ‘second-order’ constitutional event. The
distinction between ‘first order’ and ‘second order’ is usually applied to electoral
events.9 The former applies to the politically more salient national elections,
whereas second-order electoral events is used in reference to politically less salient
local elections. With regard to specific constitutional moments, clearly there is a
difference between a foundational constitutional act and a minor constitutional
revision—especially in terms of their politicization. In many cases a foundational
constitutional act can also sometimes serve a constitutive function by acting as a
vehicle for forging a common political identity and defining the demos—this was
the case in India and Pakistan in the late 1940s.10 This is hardly the case for
constitutional revisions of a second order. However, a constitutional event may be
of the first order even when it is not foundational in the aforementioned sense.
Non-foundational constitutional events can also produce significant effects such
as regime change or profound constitutional transformations. This would be the
case of Spain in 1978 or SouthAfrica in 1996,whichwere not foundational in terms
of founding a new state but were nonetheless transformational constitutional
moments. Olsen has referred to these second-order constitutional events that
involve minor constitutional revisions as ‘constitutional gardening’, since it
implies a kind of constitutional tidying-up.11 Evidently, a grey area between first-
8In connection with this point we should underlie the fact that failure is very common. Indeed, in
the case of federations most actually end in failure; see Alfred C. Stepan, ‘Federalism and democracy:
beyond the U.S. model’, Journal of Democracy, 10, 1999, pp. 19–34 and Jonathan Lemco, Political
Stability in Federal Governments, Praeger, New York, 1991.
9Karl-Heinz Reif and Hermann Schmitt, ‘Nine second-order national elections—a conceptual
framework for the analysis of European election results’, European Journal of Political Research, 8, 1980,
pp. 3–44.
10Sujit Choudhry, ‘Bridging comparative politics and comparative constitutional law:
constitutional design in divided societies’, in Sujit Choudhry (ed.), Constitutional Design for Divided
Societies: Integration or Accommodation?, Oxford University Press, Oxford and New York, 2008,
pp. 3–40.
11Johan P. Olsen, ‘Coping with conflict at constitutional moments’, Industrial and Corporate Change,
Constitution-making, constitutional conventions and conflict resolution 365
order and second-order constitutional moments exists. The distinction is merely
drawn at this stage to emphasize that the analytical focus of this paper is on what
we call ‘first-order’ constitutional moments.
To summarize then, our concern in this paper is with first-order constitutional
moments that typically involve a Rikerian type of ‘political bargain’. Mostly these
are foundational acts or attempts to introduce significant constitutional
transformation within a polity. These constitutional moments usually occur in
the context of real or perceived crises and can produce or accompany regime
change. Because it is the basic rule of the game that is at stake, such events tend to
be highly politicized. They are, in other words, political events that seek to
transform a polity. In many cases these constitutional bargains not only establish
the regulative rules that define the institutional setting but may also serve a
constitutive function. This is especially the case in divided societies where the
constitution is often the principal vehicle for forging a common political identity
through the very process of debating and negotiating a constitution.12 For the
analyst, this implies focusing on the key political actors involved, the specific
mandates or constraints they face, as well as the process by which acquiescence is
achieved on the final constitutional package. In this connection the following
three operational dimensions can be identified:
(1) Mode of representation. Since universal participation is in most cases
impracticable, representation procedures have to be established in order to
select the type of political actor entrusted with negotiating a potential
constitutional redesign. There are two basic extremes on this pole. Leaders of
social groups (e.g. ethnic, religious) or territorial groups (e.g. state, regional)
may appoint themselves as the principal interlocutors in the process.
Alternatively, the citizens or a given constituency may select their
representatives in a specially convened election.
(2) Mode of communicative interaction. In recent political theory scholars have begun
to attach great importance to the ways in which communicative interaction
takes place, especially in the public sphere setting. At the risk of gross
simplification much of the focus is on how distinct modes of debating,
especially in settings that secure the exposition of a plurality of viewpoints, can
produce more enlightened reasoning. During constitutional or foundational
moments it is possible to distinguish a continuumbetween a ‘bargaining’ and a
‘deliberative’ communicative setting. In the former, the closed bargaining
setting induces a style of personalized negotiation and potential horse-trading
(e.g. I cannot sell x to my constituency unless you compromise on issue y). In a
more public and open deliberative setting, political argumentation is
constrained by the need to argue (rather than bargain) in terms of the
common good and in a more impartial and disinterested style.
(3) Mode of legitimation. Modern notions of popular sovereignty and its
concomitant democratic creed attribute an increasing importance to citizen
participation. Applied to the constitution-making process, it favours the
Footnote 11 continued
12, 2003, pp. 815–842. Olsen also identifies a further type of constitutional transformation which is
‘evolutionary’ in nature. Though he does not mention it, an example of this more organic form of
constitutional transformation is the Supreme Court’s jurisprudence in the USA.
12Sujit Choudhry, op. cit.
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popular legitimacy that comes from allowing citizens the opportunity to
approve their own constitution. In this final stage, therefore, it is also possible
to identify a pole of legitimation: onewhere the final product of a constitution-
making process is ratified by political elites (e.g. the state executives
themselves) and an alternative ratification mechanism involving a popular
vote.
Constitutional conventions: a historical excursus
We have argued thus far that constitution-making processes can be characterized
by a continuum between various modes of representation (political leaders
versus elected assembly), types of communicative interaction (bargaining versus
deliberative settings) and legitimation procedures (ratification by state executive
versus popular vote). As with most social science concepts, these categories are
not fixed and a blurred area exists between them. Armed with this preliminary
conceptual frameworkwe are now in a position to take a closer look at a relatively
common method for founding a new political order, a constitutional convention.
History offers numerous examples with the Magna Carta—at least in the Anglo-
Saxon speaking world—sometimes credited as being one of the first. In this
section we shall attempt to unpick the concept of a constitutional convention by
using some historical cases to focus on its various operational features.
Let us start with the specific task of a constitutional convention. This is
probably the easiest point to agree upon since a constitutional convention’s
primary task is that of proposing or drafting a constitution. Whilst this may be
the case normatively, history offers a number of cases where this primary task has
been abandoned for other tasks, such as legislating. Sometimes the constitution
drafting and legislative task have been fused right from the start. This already
alerts us to some potentially important dualities. When we examine specific
operational procedures, such as how participants are selected, under what
conditions and with which type of mandate, to name but a few procedures, the
range of differentiation increases. With regard to the type of mandate, for
instance, participants are mandated with the task of considering a new
constitutional package. However, this task can range from a piecemeal reform to
the implementation of a new constitutional regime. Furthermore, a specific
mandate for piecemeal reform can be bypassed and lead to a constitutional
transformation of the first order as in the case of the USA in 1789. This suggests a
certain elasticity of the concept of a constitutional convention. The problem is not
just in terms of blurred operational procedures but also connected to
terminology. The terms constitutional convention, constitutional assembly,
constitutional conference, constituent assembly, constitutional commission,
constitutional council, tend to be all used loosely and interchangeably, often-
times referring to similar phenomena. Translation between languages does not
help (in Spanish and French the tendency is to refer to constituent assembly). In
short, there is to our knowledge no accepted scholarly taxonomy that offers
precise operational definitions for each of these terms.13 In this paper we shall not
13A notable attempt is in Patrick Farfad and Daniel R. Reid, Constituent Assemblies: A Comparative
Survey, Queen’s University, Kingston, 1991.
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seek to offer a taxonomy for the different types of constitutional conventions and
therefore accept the fuzzy nature of the concept.
To examine the range of variance in the concept of a constitutional convention
let us begin with two historically well-known cases, the Philadelphia Convention
and the French Revolutionary Assemblies. Both the Philadelphia Convention of
1787 and the French Revolutionary Assemblies (Constituent Assembly of 1789–
91 and the National Convention of 1792–95) occurred at roughly the same time
and ushered in constitutional transformations of the first order. In terms of their
origins, both experiences occurred at a time of deep conflict, though the French
case took place in the midst of revolution and external war. Thus, from a
comparative perspective the delegates’ meeting in post-revolution America
worked under less pressure and in a less hostile environment14 than the French
Assemble´e Constituante, under the threatening menace of the Parisian mob.15
The significance of the constitutional packages (various constitutions in the case
of revolutionary France) also differed considerably. While the convention in
Philadelphia gave birth to the most durable and arguably the most successful
constitution of the modern era, the French context produced an unstable
constitutional order that fuelled the reign of terror and the ascendancy of
Napoleon. Our analytical concern, however, is initially with the operational
procedures of these two historic 18th-century experiences rather than the
contextual origins. Let us now focus on the three operational dimensions that we
identified above.
In terms of the mode of representation the two cases differed. One
immediate difference is that in the US case the delegates were sent to the
convention by the states with a mandate to reform the Articles of
Confederation rather than draw up a new constitutional order. From the
citizens’ perspective, the delegates were indirectly elected or appointed by
the states’ representative institutions (legislature and/or executive). It was not
the state leaders who negotiated the new constitutional package but rather the
indirectly appointed delegates. In France’s first constituent assembly, the
delegates represented functional interests (i.e. the three estates) rather than
territorial interests. In terms of the mode of representation the most interesting
case is France’s second experience with a convention type body. In the midst of
social turmoil and imminent civil war, the National Convention of 1792–95 was
directly elected by the people and entrusted with drawing up a new
constitutional settlement. It was, in this regard, France’s first election by
universal male suffrage. In contrast to 1789, the delegates considered
themselves representatives of the nation of France rather than a particular
territorial or functional constituency.
It appears that the mode of representation had a direct effect on the second
dimension, what we refer to as the mode of communicative interaction. In the
French cases, the proceedings, which involved at times more than a thousand
delegates, were open and under the glare of publicity, whereas in Philadelphia
14Calvin C. Jillson, Constitution Making: Conflict and Consensus in the Federal Convention of 1787,
Agathon Press, New York, 1988; Catherine Bowen,Miracle at Philadelphia: The Story of the Constitutional
Convention, May to September 1787, Little Brown, Boston, 1966.
15Jim Mitchell, The French Legislative Assembly, Brill, Leiden, 1988; Michael P. Fitzsimmons, The
Remaking of France: The National Assembly and the Constitution of 1791, Cambridge University Press,
Cambridge, 1994.
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the debates took place behind closed doors and were kept secret. Elster16 has
convincingly argued that these distinct settings produced diverging modes
of debating: speakers in France argued in terms of the common good and lofty
philosophical ideals while their American counterparts bargained from positions
of self-interest. The outcome, according to Elster, was a false and unstable
consensus in France and a viable negotiated compromise in the USA. Yet these
two cases cannot constitute a ‘recipe’ since, as we will see below, other countries
followed similar processes with the inverse end-results.
Our last dimension is that of legitimation. How is a constitutional package to
be ratified and adopted? In the USA, the ratification procedure was approved by
the institutional organs of the states’ (legislatures and state conventions). There
was one exception in which the legitimacy of a popular vote was sought
however. Intriguingly, it was precisely in the case of Rhode Island where the US
constitution was rejected by a referendum. In France the constituent assembly
had discussed whether to ratify by popular vote but in the end the constitution
was submitted to the king in 1791, who accepted it. Two years later the National
Convention, whose first act was to abolish the monarchy, produced France’s first
republican constitution of 1793. In the midst of the reign of terror the constitution
was ratified by a popular vote. However, despite being ratified, France’s first
historic republican constitution was eventually never applied.
The two historical cases present notable variation in terms of distinct
operational procedures of a convention that can serve as archetypes for
distinguishing among constitutional conventions. It should be noted that the
French assemblies also morphed into legislative and executive organs, though
the context of civil strife and war helps to explain such dynamics. From a
normative perspective, the French revolutionary assemblies come closest to a
‘pure’ regime in terms of democratic criteria such as direct election, open and
deliberative discussion, as well as democratic legitimation through popular vote.
Incidentally, they combined three features of modern democratic theory that are
emphasized to varying degrees by competing representative, deliberative and
participatory models of democracy. The US constitutional convention method, a
decidedly more pragmatic and negotiated compromise, has been readily
emulated. Most notably this occurred in the case of Switzerland in the aftermath
of a civil war in which losers and victors came together to found the Swiss
Constitution of 1848. Not only did the operational procedures resemble the US
case (i.e. cantonal delegates representing territorial interests and differentiated
ratification by cantonal institutions with popular votes in some cases) but so too
did the eventual constitutional product, a separation of powers federal system.
The Swiss constitutional scholar, Ko¨lz,17 perceptively noted that while
neighbouring constitutional assemblies in France and Prussia were deliberating
lofty philosophical ideals that would give rise to the Second French Republic of
1848 and the Prussian Constitution of 1848, the Swiss delegates eschewed
abstract theorization in favour of pragmatism. The constitutional bargain struck
in 1848 that gave birth to the modern Swiss Confederation offers another
16Jon Elster, ‘Arguing and bargaining in two constituent assemblies’, University of Pennsylvania
Journal of Constitutional Law, 2, 1999, p. 345.
17Alfred Ko¨lz, Le origini della costituzione svizzera, Armando Dado Editore, Locarno, 1999.
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example of a robust constitutional settlement that brought an end to a period of
civil unrest and social conflict.
Comparative analysis
Our historical examples have highlighted similarities and differences among the
operational procedures of various models of constitutional conventions as a
specific method of constitutional transformation. In this section we present a
simplified model for examining a wider range of cases before returning to the
concept of a constitutional convention and its explicit application to the Cyprus
context. Thus far the analysis has identified three salient operational features of a
constitution-making process, the mode of representation, the mode of
communicative interaction and the mode of legitimation. These dimensions
overlap and interact in manifold ways. Here we will attempt to simplify the
model by collapsing what we have referred to as the mode of communicative
interaction to reveal a 2 £ 2 matrix shown in Figure 1.
This may be seen as a rather odd omission given our previous discussion of
the historical cases where it was suggested that the communicative mode of
interaction, deliberative versus bargaining, was decisive in achieving negotiated
compromise. We still believe this to be the case. However, for analytical purposes
the mode of communicative interaction tends to dovetail the mode of
representation. As a matter of generalization the further one moves left along
the x axis, in other words closer to elite (self) appointment, the more likely a
bargaining style of interaction will dominate. Where delegates are elected
Figure 1. Two operational dimensions.
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(especially in relatively large numbers) the conditions for deliberative style of
debating appear to be more favourable. We believe that the simplification allows
us to provide for a wider snapshot of a range of global experiences without
becoming unduly complicated. To compensate we distinguish between three
possible values on each axis. In terms of the various modes of representation, the
cases we analyse are coded as: 1 ¼ election; 0.5 ¼ indirect selection; 0 ¼ elite
(self) appointment. On the mode of legitimation axis we have coded the cases we
analyse in the following way: 1 ¼ popular vote; 0.5 ¼ institutional ratification;
and 0 ¼ elite ratification. This system of classification reveals nine possible
models of first-order constitution-making as shown in Figure 1. Note that we are
here mostly concerned with what we have referred to as the operational
procedures of a constitution-making process.
The cases selected cannot be said to be fully representative, in other words,
we have not analysed all instances of constitution-making cases which would
amount to at least several hundred historical cases. Instead, we strived for a
degree of geographic representation covering all the continents and selecting
some of the most prominent cases thereof. We present some preliminary findings
for 104 cases for which data has been collected that is part of an ongoing research
project.18 In addition, all cases marked by a double asterisk in Figure 2 are
specific cases of conflict resolution. What does our snapshot survey reveal?
Because of word constraints, we shall not be able to analyse in detail the cases we
have coded.19 Instead, we shall pick out some salient examples for illustrating
some of the dynamics involved which could be relevant to the case of Cyprus.
The simplest way to accomplish this is by focusing on the three columns. This
enables us to begin by distinguishing the area that does not belong to
conventions broadly understood. This can be seen by examining the first column
of the matrix (which includes models 1, 4 and 7). The examples noted here have
specifically not made recourse to any variant of a constitutional convention. This
type of constitution-making process is therefore characterized by elite
negotiation among executive leaders of territorial/functional or partisan groups
and is relatively common as in some of the conflict resolution cases of model 1.
Legitimation is often sought through institutional bodies such as the legislature
and, in certain cases, by popular vote. In many foundational or conflict resolution
instances, the constitutional package does not even require any further formal
ratification apart from elite acquiescence (e.g. model 1). Thus, a feature of this
column is that the need to represent the populace appears to be less important
than the perceived need for elite bargaining. Many of the cases have also had a
history of violent conflict and/or civil war, or abrupt regime change. Many are
divided societies such as Cyprus. What is interesting, and more relevant to the
Cyprus case, are some of the examples of movement along the y axis, that is, the
mode of legitimation. We can illustrate this by looking at two cases, first how
Northern Ireland has achieved a recent institutional equilibrium and, second, the
dynamics around Canada’s constitutional odyssey over the last decades. Both
18Research project with the title: ‘Constitutional Conventions, Direct Democracy and Institutional
Change’ [100015–120040] funded by the Swiss National Science Foundation.
19We plan to publish a more detailed qualitative and quantitative analysis of our ongoing research
on comparative constitution-making in a separate monograph.
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cases offer examples of divided societies and even though in the Canadian case
the conflict has not been violent, it is a first-order constitutional problem.
Both Northern Ireland and Canada have experimented with a variety of
legitimation mechanisms along the y axis and, in many respects, also exhibit
features of bi-communal conflict. As noted by one of the foremost scholars of
comparative federalism, bi-communal type conflicts—where issues more easily
acquire an all or nothing type logic—seem to be far harder to resolve than
multiple-group conflicts.20 This is a problem not limited to some of the classic
contemporary conflict cases such as Cyprus, Israel, Northern Ireland or Sri
Lanka, but can also be seen in federal systems such as present-day Canada or
Belgium. In such cases, power-sharing arrangements such as consociationalism
have been commonly proposed for conflict resolution as was indeed the case for
Cyprus. Consociationalism21 was the institutional arrangement advocated in
Northern Ireland—first in the elite bargain known as the Sunningdale
Agreement of 1973. Support for the agreement collapsed after a few months,22
however, and it was not until 1998 that a new constitutional bargain was
negotiated. The Good Friday Agreement of 1998, which has resulted in an
institutional equilibrium of sorts, had many similarities to the earlier agreement
both in terms of the process and the consociational package agreed. It was
negotiated by political elites representing the British and Irish premiers and
involved agreement with all the major political parties of Northern Ireland.
While the method of bargaining represented continuity, the mode of legitimation
differed (i.e. an upward shift along the y axis). Multiple referendums were
convoked on the same day in Northern Ireland and the Republic of Ireland and
were accepted in both territories.
Canada offers another example of experimentation with various constitution-
making methods (models 5, 1 and 7 in chronological order). Its most recent
attempts have revolved around trying to bring Quebec into the constitutional
order. Constitutional negotiations involve a particular style of bargaining among
peak elites, provincial leaders and federal prime ministers, who typically agree
on a constitutional package which then requires institutional ratification. This
was the case for the constitutional negotiations that led to the Meech Lake
Accords of 1987.23 By 1990 this elite-driven exercise (model 1) failed the
institutional ratification hurdle since many of the provincial legislatures did not
ratify within the three-year limit. Two years later, in 1992, a second elite-driven
package was similarly negotiated privately among federal and provincial
premiers. This time, however, a new mode of legitimation was used.24 Although
20Daniel Judah Elazar, The American Constitutional Tradition, University of Nebraska Press, Lincoln,
1988.
21Commonly taken to possess four operational features: executive power-sharing; high degree of
self-government; proportionality; and veto-rights.
22It is important to note that a ‘Border Poll’ was held shortly after the Northern Ireland agreements
of 1973. According to some analysts this ‘futile border poll’ is hardly comparable to the two
referendums that were held after the 1998 agreements, see Jonathan Tonge, ‘From Sunningdale to the
Good Friday Agreement: creating devolved government in Northern Ireland’, Contemporary British
History, 14, 2000, pp. 39–60.
23Michael B. Stein, ‘Improving theprocess of constitutional reform inCanada: lessons from theMeech
Lake andCharlottetown constitutional rounds’,Canadian Journal of Political Science, 30, 1997, pp. 307–338.
24Wayne Norman, Negotiating Nationalism: Nation-Building, Federalism, and Secession in the
Multinational State, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2006.
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still involving an elite bargain, the 1992 Charlottetown constitutional package
sought popular legitimation through a referendum (model 7). This time Canada’s
latest attempt at constitutional overhaul failed the popular ratification hurdle
with most provinces, including Quebec, rejecting the constitutional compromise.
As in the case of Cyprus, elite-driven constitutional bargains can frequently fail
the referendum test.
The first column in the matrix is most relevant for the Cyprus case and will be
discussed further in the following section. We now turn to the remaining two
columns. Our argument is that all the boxes in columns two and three are
examples of conventions broadly understood. Let us begin with the second
column (which includes models 2, 5 and 8). One of the classic archetypes is the
US convention. As discussed in the previous section, the convention was
indirectly selected and ratification of the constitutional package was achieved by
the institutional organs of the constituent units of the new US federation. This
method has been quite common, and has been used in cases such as Switzerland
in the 1840s and many more in the 20th century. African cases are well
represented in this column. Indeed, it is possible to identify an African model,
frequently referred to as a constitutional conference, which involves a large body
of representatives (sometimes up to a thousand or more). In some instances the
process described in this column also fails at the popular ratification hurdle, as
was the case in Kenya in 2004. It also occurredwith Australia’s first constitutional
convention in 1891. What is curious about the Australian case is that in its second
constitutional convention the operational procedures were altered. This time
elites opted for a directly elected assembly instead of an indirectly elected one
as in 1891 (i.e. a shift along the mode of representation axis) while retaining the
popular legitimation device of the referendum. The approval through popular
vote gave birth to the modern Australian Federal Constitution which took effect
in 1901.
The Australian case brings us neatly to the third column (which includes
models 3, 6 and 9) along the mode of representation axis. These are cases of
directly elected constitutional conventions, usually referred to as constituent
assemblies. What has surprised us in the sample of cases we have analysed is
the relative frequency of this method of first-order constitution-making.
Furthermore, it appears that there is a trade-off, which can be seen by the high
number of cases in model 3 and model 9 in relation to model 6 of our sample.
Either the input legitimacy derived from directly electing the assembly is
sufficient to allow the elected body itself to ratify the constitution (model 3) or
additional output legitimacy is sought by popular ratification (model 9). There
were relatively few intermediate cases, that is, those that sought institutional
ratification. In the widely admired recent ‘textbook’ case of South Africa, the
legitimation of a separate institutional body was required. The constitution was
institutionally ratified, by both the Supreme Court and the legislature in which
a two-thirds majority was required. Interestingly, in the absence of a
supermajority, a referendum would have been triggered. Had this been the
case, then South Africa would have moved upwards into model 9. In many
respects, model 9 offers the ‘purest’ example of a constitutional convention. The
French national convention is an archetype that was illustrated in the third
section. Nonetheless, variants of it have been used to successfully implement
Australia’s foundational constitutional text, and the model has also been
374 Fernando Mendez and Vasiliki Triga
imposed by external actors as in the case of Iraq in 2005. Indeed, the model
appears to be common in Latin America. Here there is a potential Latin model
which might include the most recent Spanish case in 1978 and a series of
Chavez-inspired cases (first in Venezuela and subsequently followed in
relatively close succession by Ecuador and Bolivia).
We shall conclude this section with the observation that, when it comes to
first-order constitutional moments, our snapshot survey reveals a veritable
multiplicity of commonly used operational procedures. Interestingly, we have
also found conflict resolution cases in all models. We shall investigate the
implications of the various models for the case of Cyprus in the section
below.
Cyprus: a new look
The matrix allows us to have a fresh look at the case of Cyprus and visualize the
evolution of its constitutional dynamics. As with many of the cases we have
surveyed, Cyprus’ foundational constitutional act occurred in the context of
independence from the British. Historically, this has produced some of the
world’s most robust and successful federations. However, more often than not,
the British legacy has frequently been a negative one. Cyprus is definitely an
example of the negative type. The foundational constitutional act of Cyprus in
1960 proved to be an unstable compromise. This is not uncommon with many of
Figure 3. The case of Cyprus.
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our examples suggesting that foundational constitutional moments do not
always generate an institutional equilibrium and have to be re-negotiated.
Tensions can frequently flare up, generate social strife and even result in
military conflict, as in the case of Cyprus. Nevertheless, our focus in looking at
Cyprus is not so much on the outcomes and the final product of a given
foundational act or constitutional moment, but rather on its specific procedures.
Figure 3 applies the conceptual framework of the previous section to the case of
Cyprus.
According to our conceptual schema, the 1960 Constitution of Cyprus was the
result of an elite agreement. It was elite-driven both in terms of representation
and in the way it was adopted. Additionally, for the Greek Cypriot side in
particular, the constitutional settlement was perceived as externally imposed.
Our survey has revealed many imposed settlements in conflict cases such as
Bosnia and Iraq in Figure 2. In Cyprus the settlement did not last very long and
broke down within five years. Forty years after the breakdown of Cyprus’
foundational constitutional act in 1964, the most recent attempt to reconstitute
the Cypriot constitutional order took place in 2004. The 40-year period was
interspersed, amongst other things, with inter-communal violence, an attempted
coup, foreign military intervention and a de facto separation of the two
communities. The most recent constitutional package, the Annan Plan of 2004,
was the result of many rounds of internationally brokered negotiations and built
upon many previous failures at achieving a negotiated compromise. In certain
respects, there were many similarities between the process of 1960 and the
constitutional package of 2004. Most obviously, both processes were elite affairs
that were negotiated behind closed doors, a method that is not uncommon in
conflict resolution cases. In addition, a dominant role was played by external
actors in both processes: the guarantor powers in 1960 and the UN in 2004
(in collaboration with the guarantor powers). However, in the negotiations
leading up to 2004, it is manifestly the case that the respective leaders of the
Greek Cypriot and Turkish Cypriot communities played a much more significant
role, while the UN can be considered as a more credible neutral broker than the
guarantor powers during the previous foundational constitutional moment.
Nonetheless, in terms of the mode of representation there was no change
between 1960 and 2004. There was one crucial shift with regard to the mode of
legitimation however. Here we witness an important shift along the y axis
towards a model that requires the popular legitimation of a referendum.
The latter took place on the same day on both sides of the divided island but was
rejected by the Greek Cypriot community.
This type of upward shift (along the y axis) has been documented in our
comparative analysis of other bi-communal conflict. For instance, the referendum
device was used to achieve a constitutional equilibrium in the case of Northern
Ireland six years before the Annan Plan referendum. The former was also held on
the same day in both the Republic of Ireland and Northern Ireland. No doubt the
apparent success of the Northern Ireland case had an influence on the choice of
ratification mechanism for Cyprus. The referendum climate was certainly
propitious given the wave of referendums that had been held during the EU’s
Eastern Enlargement of 2004, which also included the Republic of Cyprus.
However, unlike Northern Ireland, where some analysts talk of benign external
intervention, the role of external actors in Cyprus has been perceived negatively,
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in particular by the Greek Cypriots, and is widely cited as one of the reasons for
rejection by the latter community.25 We come back to this point below. Another
case—with certain bi-communal features—where similar upward movement
along the y axis has taken place, is in Canada. Although the context is evidently
very different, the political and constitutional impasse is nevertheless highly
salient. Canada’s recent constitutional odyssey is characterized by bargains
hammered out behind closed doors by territorial elites, which have then failed
the institutional ratification procedure and, most recently, legitimation by
popular vote. In Canada there is certain disillusionment with its political culture
of executive federalism for constitution-making (bargaining among territorial
leaders). If the Cypriots were to settle on a new (con)federal arrangement, it
would surely have a strong executive component not unlike the Canadian case.
Factors related to the political culture in Cyprus are important in this connection.
Historically, both communities could be said to possess features of ‘delegative
democracy’ a model usually applied to Latin America cases.26 This model is
characterized by highly competitive elections, but once elected the President
enjoys considerable freedom from constraints.
In short, it appears that movement along the y axis (mode of legitimation) is
easier to achieve than along the x axis (mode of representation) in Cyprus and
this has been demonstrated by the most recent experience. Let us examine the
implications of what a move along the mode of representation axis would entail.
We have already mentioned the tendency for difficult conflict resolution cases to
be negotiated by elite bargains, though our survey reveals much variance.
We have also suggested political culture and a tendency towards delegative
democracy may also play a role in the case of Cyprus. Under what conditions
could a rightward shift along the x axis occur? The simplest explanation is
ultimately one that is based on the incentives facing political elites. Why should
political elites give up their ability to shape a foundational constitutional
arrangement that will determine the eventual rules of the game to a body that
may ultimately escape their control? Ordinarily, elites would need to be under an
extraordinary compulsion to give up this power. Of course, it would be possible
to retain control by appointing partisans and limiting the mandate of a
constitution drafting body. This has been the model adopted in many post-Soviet
constitution-making processes. Nonetheless, there are moments of impasse
where a rightward shift has occurred—even in difficult cases. Let us assume,
then, that in the case of Cyprus there could be rightward shift along the x axis.
What form would it take? Although the matrix reveals a range of basic models,
some could be considered more likely than others. Why should this be so? Our
simple argument is that history matters and can have potential lock-in effects. We
believe it would be difficult for any future Cypriot constitutional package to
bypass the popular legitimation hurdle. The need for the legitimationmechanism
of a referendum for a foundational sovereign and constitutional act is, therefore,
a reasonable assumption to hold in the case of Cyprus. This suggests only three
scenarios along the top row of the matrix, models 7, 8 and 9. Model 7 was the
method used for the Annan Plan (note that we are referring to the operational
25Van Coufoudakis and Klearchos Kyriakides, The Case Against the Annan Plan, Lobby for Cyprus,
London, 2004.
26Guillermo O’Donnell, ‘Delegative democracy’, Journal of Democracy, 7, 1994, pp. 112–126.
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features of model 7 and not to any of its substantive content). We still believe this
to be the most likely model pursued by political elites. Indeed, current
negotiations appear to follow the elite bargaining and popular ratification model.
Nonetheless, model 7 is not written in stone and a constellation of endogenous
and/or exogenous factors (such as popular disillusionment with elite-based
negotiations or external pressure) could precipitate political leaders to move
rightward along the x axis. To the extent that such a shift were to occur, it would
involve implementing some variant of a constitutional convention. If so, then
there are only two basic models available, models 8 and 9. This brings us neatly
back to the issue of a constitutional convention for Cyprus.
Let us start with model 9 which we shall refer to as the Auerian model of a
constitutional convention for Cyprus.27 As noted in earlier sections, from a
normative democratic perspective this is the ‘purest’ regime in terms of the
mechanisms it offers across both the representation and legitimation axes. Apart
from its normative democratic foundations, the Auerian Constitutional
Convention (CC) parts from the premise that the role of external powers has
been detrimental to the resolution of the Cypriot problem. What better way to
address the conflict, therefore, than to provide the Cypriot people with the
political mechanisms for resolving their own internal dispute? Whether this is
feasible or not is a separate question for the moment since the crucial analytical
point is to underscore that the Auerian CC is a participatory exercise par
excellence. At least two, if not more, separate referendums are envisaged. One to
launch the process and one to bring it to an end for both communities. If the
launching referendum is successful then a further election will be convoked to
directly elect the constitution-making body. A positive spillover is that in the
process of electing delegates, a national debate will be triggered. Sometimes this
can, in and of itself, be a catalyst for reconciliation of antagonistic groups as
appears to be the case in South Africa. In theory, the combined effect of these
participatory procedures and the accompanying debates both inside and outside
the convention provide favourable conditions for deliberative communicative
interactions across the wider public sphere. Lastly, the popular veto point at the
end of the process in the form of a referendum requiring a majority in both
communities ought to stimulate a culture of compromise and negotiated
settlement rather hard-nosed bargaining. This still leaves the very uncertainty of
the popular vote which could derail even the most crafted and delicate
compromise as the advocates of the Annan Plan were to learn. In sum, the
Auerian CC manages to intriguingly reconcile three different strands in
democratic theory. First, it incorporates a Schumpeterian mechanism which
allows the citizens to select their delegates among a cartel of political elites;
second, it offers conditions that are theoretically favourable to a Habermasian
style public sphere oriented deliberative interaction; finally a Rousseauian
participatory dimension ensures that the entire process is launched and
ratified through mechanisms of direct citizen participation. Evidently, a shift
towards the Auerian CCmodel would be a very bold move on the part of Cypriot
elites.
What of model 8? The first thing to note is that there has actually been a
constitutional convention of this type in Cyprus (see model 8 in Figure 2).
27Andreas Auer, op. cit.
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According to Wolf,28 a constituent assembly of 70 members was assembled from
the legislature with the task of providing a constitutional framework for the
‘Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus’ (‘TRNC’). They convened in January 1984
and drafted a constitution, which was approved by the Constituent Assembly in
March 1985. It was then submitted to a popular referendum in May 1985 and
approved by 70 per cent of eligible voters, which included the new immigrant
community from Turkey.29 Hence at least one of the two communities already has
a direct experience of a constituent assembly.
As to its potential as a future model it should be noted that the range of
variance within model 8 is large. For our analytic purposes the key is what we
have referred to as indirect selection. Should Cypriot elites decide on a rightward
move along the x axis they could simply select a group of partisan appointees.
Alternatively, the selection of the convention body could be the result of a
(s)election by the respective legislatures rather than executive appointment. One
could add a whole range of additional criteria such as the specific mandate of the
body (wide versus narrow), its composition (technocratic versus political), its
duration (long versus short) and the degree of public input (high versus low)—to
name but a few. Despite this variance, from the citizens’ perspective the selection
of the delegates is indirect—though some procedures are obviously more
‘indirect’ than others. To sum up, if popular dissatisfaction with elite negotiations
or a combination of internal and external pressures lead Cypriot elites to decide
on a rightwardmove on the representation axis, then political expedience and the
desire to maintain control of the process may induce them to seek some variant of
the indirect selection model. Hybrid models can also be devised such as the
mixed criteria used in some Colombian and Australian conventions, half-elected
and half-appointed, and one can envisage various combinations thereof.
The major point to underline is that movement along the x axis can vary from
the ‘pure’ democratic model advocated by Auer to a model which may in
practice differ only slightly from the elite bargaining represented by the Annan
Plan.
Conclusions
By way of conclusion we can offer the following observations about the
convention method and some speculations about its relevance to the case of
Cyprus. The constitutional convention method, according to our expansive
understanding, is a relatively common constitution-making method. Indeed, of
the 104 cases we surveyed, it is the most popular method. Though the variation
among these different cases is large, some variant of the convention method
has been adopted in most first-order constitutional moments we have analysed.
In addition, and perhaps rather more surprisingly, the convention method is also
used during instances of conflict resolution. This occurred in roughly half of our
sample of cases. Turning to Cyprus, we have shown that a variety of mechanisms
have been used to date. Most recently, there has been a movement towards the
output legitimacy that is conferred through a popular vote. We have argued that
this move is likely to have lock-in effects such that any further constitutional
28James H. Wolf, ‘Cyprus: federation under international safeguards’, Publius, 18, 1988, pp. 75–89.
29Ibid.
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package is likely to require the specific assent of the people in a referendum.
Furthermore, and again somewhat surprisingly, we have observed that a
constituent assembly (a variant of a convention according to our understanding)
has already been used in Cyprus. This was the case in the ‘TRNC’ in 1984–85.
In short, there is no a priori reason why the convention method would not
constitute an optimal constitution-making mechanism in the case of Cyprus. On
the contrary, we believe there are some very good theoretical (and especially
normative) reasons in favour of some variant of the convention while the
empirical analysis has identified a number of cases where it has been used—even
in conflict resolution cases. A comparative institutional perspective would
suggest that, if current negotiations prove ineffective, then some variant of a
convention could indeed be a possible mechanism of constitutional design.
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